PLANNING HISTORY
BULLETIN OF THE INTERNATIONAL PLANNING HISTORY SOCIETY

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Editorial

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As you may have read elsewhere, this issue of Planning History bulletin is to be the final one in independent form. The current editor has worked on the bulletin for the past six years. Previous recent editors have included Michael Harrison, Peter Larkham and Steven V Ward.

Planning History was inaugurated during the later 1970s, a few years after the formation of the Planning History Society, for which it became the annual bulletin. The field of planning history in all its diversity has also become increasingly internationalised, as was reflected in the formation of the IPHS in 1993 from its predecessor the Planning History Society. The content of the bulletin also reflected the interests of planning historians around the world, and lazy accusations or complaints that the discipline of planning history is biased towards either an Anglo-centric approach or towards the West appear to be increasingly unfounded.

Henceforth, Planning History will merge with Planning Perspectives: an International Journal of Planning History and the Environment. The journal is published by Taylor and Francis and is well known to most planning historians as a sort of larger sibling of Planning History.

In the light of Alan Hutchings’s piece in this bulletin, it may also be a good idea to reflect upon the synergies of planning history with other disciplines. Planning history has to an extent and quite understandably been top-down, concerned with the iconic figures of the planners themselves, their plans and their linkages with elite power networks. The experience of ‘the planned for’, the people who move into the realised environments of the planners and architects, opens up considerable opportunities for planning and social history. In addition the costing of key plans and their ultimate expense, and the strategic dispersal of industries of new planned environments, offer both economic, business and planning historians avenues of possible funding. In an increasingly urbanising world, the social and economic audits of planning experiments during the twentieth century may hold valuable lessons for future plans, and possible opportunities for academic funding.

Please note: All members of the IPHS will receive Planning Perspectives from now on.

Encouraging “Primary History”

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Town and country planning is many things but at its core it is a professional endeavour. Likewise Planning History means many things to many people but what does it mean to the professional practitioner?

At the ‘Past Matters’ UPH Conference in Wellington NZ in February 2006, I gave a paper in which I tried to worry this through. I used my own experiences both as a practitioner and as a historian. In my conclusion, I observed that while colleagues show a general ‘lay’ interest in planning history, unless articles are about the nuts and bolts of how practice has evolved their attention wavers’. I also commented that I found it impossible to compose my paper within the strictures that bind academic papers. My paper was a personal reflection about the interweaving of planning history and planning practice. How does one stand apart as a detached third party in such circumstances? This certainly gave the referees of my paper pause and to reflect in turn.

‘Oral History’ is the stock answer in this situation. But not everyone is comfortable with this approach. People with something to say often want to work it through themselves, albeit not necessarily within an academic framework. What they have to say is often not only interesting but also crucial to historical understanding, particularly in relation to how decisions are made, the organizational context within which they are made and how they are implemented.

An example. At the 14th South Australian State History Conference held in the regional city of Whyalla in May 2005 an also now retired Public Service colleague gave a paper on how uranium mining policy in South Australia has evolved. Keith Johns was the State’s Director of Mines and his paper dealt with politics, nuclear science, relationships with multinational mining companies and the internal workings of the bureaucracy. It was an insightful and reasoned paper based on his own experiences. It was not about, in a form that academic referees would be likely to accept. More to the point, Keith said he would not be interested in spending the time to make it so.

In my view, this type of paper is vital for historians dealing with fields of professional endeavour that have complex interrelationships between practice, administration and theory. It is not unknown for evaluations by academic researchers to be awry when the ‘inside story’ is told. The editors of the South Australian History Society’s journal have created a ‘primary history’ category to deal with this. It seems to me that ‘Planning History’ could do likewise and encourage practitioners accordingly. Of course, one would expect papers to be well composed, with relevant references and that credentials would be checked.

I would like to think this suggestion is in the spirit of the type historical inquiry that Gordon Cherry encouraged us to pursue. Gordon’s paper at the 1986 World Planning Congress in Adelaide (organized by the RAPI, RTPI and EAROPH) was a masterly interplay between theory, practice and history. But would today’s referees have accepted it?
The great Australian dream is often thought of in terms of home ownership. The security of knowing that one has a home of one's very own (as long as the mortgage repayments can be met) has been a goal of many Australians over many decades. This paper focuses on asymmetrically post-war. In conjunction with the suburbanization benefits of owner-occupation including home security.

As a suburban nation the aspiration by Australians to claim their home as their own follows a long history of desire for the benefits of owner-occupation including home security. Originally occupied by the wealthy seeking solace from dirty crowded cities, it was the semi-rural conditions in the suburbs, which boasted clean air and domestic privacy, that were pursued by the middle-classes. These sought-after living conditions have been inherited by domestic cultures in Australia, North America and Canada - all largely populated by British immigrants during their early settlement. The guesstimate of suburban development may resemble similar form on an international scale, however small yet significant differences set the aforementioned countries apart.

Following the Depression of the 1930s and the further economic hardships of World War II, the post-war period sparked a critical shortage of houses in Australia (Firth, 2004). Nationally, the shortfall was estimated at 120,000 dwellings (CHC, 1944). This crisis had been looming due to the combination of severe scarcity in building materials which began during the Depression years, virtual cessation of housing construction during the war, economic policy, increased employment due to a shift from economic performance in the rural sector to the manufacturing sector during World War II, and finally a vast increase in the number of people requiring residences following the war. The last was largely due to servicemen returning either to their existing families, or to begin one. Many women took paid work during World War II, and while servicemen were overseas they were 'speculating about home...as a way of imagining the peace, and the space and comforts of domesticity and family' (Murphy, 2000, p. 18). It was these circumstances that fostered a sense of home privacy, where home became an important symbol of domesticity and privacy.

During World War II the Federal Government established the Commonwealth Housing Commission (CHC) to report and make recommendations on the housing position. The Commission recommended that 50,000 houses be built in the first year following the end of the war, rising to 80,000 (Bunning, 1945) in the third post-war year and continuing at that rate for approximately ten years until the housing crisis had been alleviated. State Government Housing Authorities provided over half of the required houses in the first few years of post-war reconstruction, with private builders making up the shortfall.

Although for Australians the first half of the 20th century was tumultuous and unsettling, the post-war era brought optimism and hope for a new future. It marked the beginnings of a period of extraordinary population growth stimulated by the Australian government's introduction of a vigorous program of immigration from abroad and by a marked increase in the birth rate (a generation known as "baby boomers"). Post-war reconstruction led to a significant period of suburban planning and development. By 1954, 63 percent of the Australian population had achieved a home of their own, an increase from 45 percent only seven years earlier (Lees et al., 1987).

Many of the new post-war suburbs relied on the involvement of community. With the return of servicemen, who generally returned to paid work after the war if they were able, women were appointed homemakers. Tasks were generally of a domestic nature but also included the 'collective community-making' (Murphy et al., 2004, p. 279) that helped make the suburbs 'harmless'. Men, too, contributed to the making of community, through the formation of various institutions such as local RSL (Returned Servicemen League) Clubs and Progress Associations.

Government contribution to housing

The release of the CHC Report in 1944 prompted state governments to respond to the housing crisis by facilitating large-scale subsidised housing through state housing authorities such as the South Australian Housing Trust (SAHT), one of the most successful such agencies nationally. The estimated local housing shortfall was between 10 and 15,000 in 1948 (Marsden, 1986). Demand did not let up for some years and was further stimulated by post-war immigration - by 1954 South Australia had gained well over 60,000 immigrants, the majority of British or Irish origin. The SAHT played a major role in housing them in its new developments in metropolitan and rural South Australia. The premier of the day, Sir Thomas (Tom) Playford, was a keen supporter both of the Trust and of overseas migration, believing an increase in population of working age would lead to increased industrialization and economic stability for the state. The 1960s would see further recruitment through immigration with particular focus in the United Kingdom.

The most ambitious project undertaken by the SAHT was the development in the early 1950s of the satellite town of Elizabeth north of Adelaide. After several years of careful planning, construction commenced in 1954 and provided housing for both homebuyers and housing tenants. Of course much more was required in the new town than just housing, and the Trust also built schools, shops and civic facilities and provided a commendable array of community facilities and parks (Peel, 1995, p. 63). The Elizabeth development was held in high regard by commentators of the day, but later observers noted shortcomings like traffic problems created by a highway through the heart of the town, little variety in employment prospects, and a monotonous vista of housing, fencing and furniture (Stretton, 1989).

Private contribution to building

Towards the end of the 1950s, the SAHT had made significant headway in alleviating metropolitan Adelaide's housing drought. With the Trust's response to critical housing shortages early in the post-war reconstruction era, room emerged in the market for 'private enterprise to play a bigger role, and move beyond uninteresting mediocre housing' (Hickinbotham, 2003, p. 63). A number of private builders emerged including Hickinbotham, AV Homes and Fred Myers Developments. Most of these standard company designs aimed to deal with the tastes and needs of the individual homebuyer market, a more complex proposition than the solution of mass-produced government housing (Garden, 1992).

In order to accommodate the speed and scale of housing provision required, building company developers purchased land on the metropolitan fringes. Moving to the fringe was potentially appealing to homebuyers as a means of escaping the confines of urban dwelling. The new post-war suburbs afforded a fresh start in fresh air and open space, with the luxury of home privacy, a scarcity for families who had been living in cramped conditions.
One such suburban development was the Para Hills Estate (known as Para Hills), situated on former agricultural land 8.5 miles north of Adelaide. While the size of the development at 430 acres (174 hectares) was about one-tenth of its northern counterpart, Elizabeth, it was, nonetheless, a remarkable addition to metropolitan Adelaide. The developer, Reid Murray Developments (SA) Ltd (RMD), planned a £6 million, 1,250 home suburb, the first development of its scale and kind in Australia (RMD, “Free Enterprise”). The Para Hill Estate was officially opened by Premier Playford on 2 August 1960, and was met with an eager crowd of 30,000 people—a strong indication that the homebuyer market was inflating (Hicksbooth, 2003). The site of Para Hills, specifically chosen for its proximity to the flourishing manufacturing industry located in nearby Salisbury and Elizabeth, was considered remote for suburban development at the time. Although it may have appeared that RMD had taken a gamble in its choice of the new suburb’s location it soon paid off, and subsequent metropolitan development ensured that the suburb of Para Hills was no longer isolated.

"Living’s Good at Para Hills":
In an attempt to alleviate any reluctance on the part of potential homebuyers to move to the metropolitan fringe, RMD successfully negotiated the supply of services—water, sewage, electricity, gas—associated with modern living to the entire estate prior to the commencement of any construction. Additionally, the company included sealed roads, drainage, kerbing, and yards fenced on three sides in the purchase price of every home. It set aside generous areas for recreation including playgrounds, a public swimming pool, and parks that were to be landscaped with trees grown in RMD’s own nursery. The developer secured agreements with the retail chain Woolworths to build a supermarket, as well as with the Education Department to establish a school and with the postal authority to provide a Post Office (RMD, “Free Enterprise”). This idea of a fully planned environment was a key focus for RMD, with the Para Hills development a direct response not only to critical housing shortages but also to popular demand for affordable quality housing and the post-war ideal of home security.

Vacant blocks of land were not available for purchase at Para Hills. Rather, homebuyers were to choose a house and land package from the extensive range priced ‘to sell from £3,995 to £5,500’ (City of Salisbury, 1985, p. 14). A deposit ‘from as low as £350’ (“Public Announcement”, 1961) was required. While the sales brochures gave the impression that the deposit was ‘low’ and reasonable, it bordered on 9% of the purchase price—an amount equal to if not greater than today’s standards.

While RMD may have had one of the more affordable options for consumers, it must eventually have seemed evident that their deposit was not within reach of some South Australians who were in the market for a new home. By December 1961 (16 months after the Para Hill Estate was officially opened), RMD was advertising new incentives to homebuyers for deposit savings. In one scheme, RMD would open a bank account in the clients’ name with the clients making their own savings deposits. RMD would then match the banks’ interest on savings (once the client had signed a contract of sale on a RMD house) (“Financing Plans”, 1961), effectively assisting consumers to save their deposit for an RMD home sooner.

In another clever sales strategy, RMD advertised that it would accept ‘illegitimate’ trade-in for a new home in the Para Hills Estate. This scheme would allow homebuyers who already had land in other suburban locations to trade it in at full market value as full or part deposit for a new RMD home, regardless if the land was fully paid for or not. According to RMD’s sales literature this would have appealed to consumers who could not ‘see any prospect of building on [their own block of land] ... because of severe shortage of money’ (“Trade in Your Idle Land”, n.d.), as a trade-in for a home in the Para Hills Estate. This scheme would allow homebuyers who already had land in other suburban locations to trade it in at full market value as full or part deposit for a new RMD home, regardless if the land was fully paid for or not. According to RMD’s sales literature this would have appealed to consumers who could not ‘see any prospect of building on [their own block of land] ... because of severe shortage of money’ (“Trade in Your Idle Land”, n.d.). Trading in a block of unusable land for a new home would have been tempting if cash to engage a private builder was hard to come by.

There remains little doubt that RMD attempted to contribute positively towards an aesthetically pleasing post-war residential development in the Para Hill Estate. Conscious of the public’s apparent distaste for monotonous residential design, it offered an extraordinary range of house styles. In order to cater to most tastes, both conventional and contemporary designs were available. All homes were of brick veneer construction, and were designed by RMD’s own designers in collaboration ‘with some of Adelaide’s leading private architects’ (RMD, n.d., p. 11).

In total there were just under 90 plans to choose from, all had a minimum of three bedrooms and some had four. However to encourage diversity in the residential landscape, RMD placed restrictions on the number of each design to be built, and then dispersed them as widely as possible (“Living’s Good”, 1961). The layout comprised either eight or nine main rooms—three or four bedrooms, living room, bathroom, laundry, kitchen and separate dining—with bedrooms generally located to one side of the house and living spaces on the other. Emphasising loads of room for growing families to live was a common theme in RMD’s advertising material—these statements were selling the spaciousness of the new homes, but also referred to the layout of the Estate itself, as RMD set aside fifteen percent (or three times) the prescribed minimum of five percent of open community space (“Three Bedrooms”, n.d.).

Homebuyers were getting more than an empty house in Para Hills. All homes came equipped with gas appliances (hot water service, stove and fire), and ‘in the kitchen there’s cupboard space enough for any housewife’ (“Three Bedrooms, 1961). Interior features included ‘luxury finish’, mosaic tiled bathroom floors, terrazzo parquetry, lifetime ceramic wall tiles and modern colour schemes unique to the estate (“Public Announcement, 1961). RMD went one step further than its competitors, entering partnerships with appliance manufacturers to supply conveniences to each of the new homes. Air-conditioning units were installed in some with ducting systems providing ‘the comfort of a modern three bedroom home with everything built-in—including the weather’ (“Now – RMD Announces”, n.d.). RMD designed and built the ‘Springtime’ home, the ultimate in modern living, around a ducted air-conditioning system to provide homebuyers with the option of a temperature controlled environment year-round.

Further partnerships with appliance manufacturers (such as the whitegoods manufacturer Pope) involved a home package that included the house and land, a brand new washing machine, refrigerator and television set. This particular package was aimed at couples who had used their savings for the home deposit. RMD recognised that ‘major appliances represent a big capital outlay or heavy additional term payments’ (“Package Plan”, 1961), so, to alleviate heavy financial commitments, and lure homebuyers, it packaged the appliances in with the home price. Striking partnerships with appliance manufacturers ensured that only those homebuyers who were also prepared to homebuyers at the most competitive price possible but also suggested that ‘luxury’ appliances like air-conditioners were no longer for the sole benefit of the well-off.

Marketing Para Hills

The financial commitment by RMD to such a large-scale housing project demanded a vigorous marketing plan to ensure its prosperity, and history treats the developers as successful in their endeavour to sell the
suburb of Para Hills to homebuyers both locally and abroad. RMD embarked on an experiential marketing campaign to spark both awareness of and sales in Adelaide's newest, and Australia's largest, private suburban development (“Festival of Homes”, 1960). Multiple full-page newspaper advertisements offered information about the development. A ‘Festival of Homes’, 18 exhibition homes, provided the opportunity for the interested public to experience the Para Hills Estate firsthand. [Figure 4] Showcasing the latest in finishes and home furnishings, visitors (whether prospective homebuyers or not) were able to engage directly with concepts and conveniences of modern day living. A clever and seductive American-inspired marketing technique (Besley, 1995) and the impressive array of latest in finishes and home furnishings were intended to grab the attention of the prospective homebuyer. RMD provided facts regarding Adelaide’s average weather statistics to help compare the climate (and consequent lifestyle) with their current place of living. Boasting short mild winters and an average of over 97 hours of sunshine a day during the summer (“Move to Sunny South Australia”, n.d.), it is no wonder Para Hills became an attraction for citizens of the United Kingdom.

Even if the further enticing aspects of the lifestyle possible at Para Hills (including fishing and skiing) were not quite convincing enough, RMD went so far as to provide its own Employment Placing Service ‘for migrants and their families who live at Para Hills’ (“Move to Sunny South Australia”, n.d.). This service was to work in conjunction with the Federal Government Employment Service, and while it did not guarantee employment it’s inception suggests that RMD was particularly keen to sell the estate to overseas homebuyers. Later sales material contains the testimonials of several Para Hills residents, including one homebuyer who had emigrated from the United Kingdom wanting to escape the cold climate. He and his family chose to buy a home in the estate because they saw Para Hills ‘as a suburb with a great future’ (“Para Hills is the Place”, n.d.).

Encouraging community involvement
RMD Managing Director Max Liberman was particularly active in encouraging Para Hills’ residents to get involved in the local community, and to make the suburb their own. Various associations and clubs were formed in the early years, and RMD helped lay the foundation for community activities by providing facilities such as a public swimming pool and meeting hall. It may be due to the large number of young families (RMD’s main target group), who moved to the suburb, that such a vibrant community spirit evolved as parents found ways to meet and help one another in the creation of an enjoyable place to live. This message of ‘a vigorous Australian community’ (“Para Hills”, n.d.) was one of many that were sent abroad in order to capture the attention of potential immigrant families.

One British migrant was Mr A Storer who, once he had secured employment in Australia, brought his young family out on a ship in early 1961 (Storer interview, 2006). As was common at the time for newly arrived migrants, hostel accommodation was the first introduction to life in Adelaide, and for Storer and his family this was no exception. Employed by the Weapons Research Establishment (WRE) in Salisbury, he soon became familiar with the area north of Adelaide due to travel between the family’s temporary accommodation in Adelaide and his job. Fellow migrants wrote, inviting the Storers to visit their new home in Para Hills. Keen to escape life in the cramped hostel and to find their own home, the family consequently made a decision to settle in Para Hills.

Concerned to improve infrastructure and resources at Para Hills, Mr Storer was quick to get involved in the local community, taking a position on the first committee of the Para Hills Progress Association. Actively canvassing new residents of the estate for interest in operating local trade and small business was an example of RMD’s attempts at engaging local business and community involvement. According to Para Hills residents Mr and Mrs Johnson who had moved from the inner southern Adelaide suburb of Hyde Park to the estate, Max Liberman approached them a few months after their arrival to start-up the first local delicatessen (Johnson interview), as he was aware that they had previously operated a similar business. Although Woolworths had begun trading from a temporary location in the suburb, whether by community demand or foresight by Liberman and RMD, it was acknowledged that residents needed fresh produce and groceries available to them locally. RMD summarised that alleviating the need for residents to leave the estate for procurement of essential goods and services was an investment in creating a viable community, if residents needed to leave the estate for some everyday items, they would soon leave for all of their needs, thus undermining local trade and business in the new community [Figure 5].

The Johnsons opened the store, one of a small number of local businesses that operated from ‘the district’s first commercial centre’ (City of Salisbury, 1985, p. 24). A purpose-built shopping centre was part of RMD’s sales package to homebuyers, and it opened to the public in September 1963, two years after the first residents moved onto the estate.

Community involvement stands out as a key aspect of the success of the Para Hills development and RMD was acutely aware of the invaluable advantage of community support. The suburb’s plan provided sites for a number of community facilities including the community hall adjoining the public swimming pool. Additionally, RMD secured agreements with the Education Department to establish a school and with six different religious denominations to take up the option of purchasing land (“The Builder”, 1960). RMD provided school students with a blazer and tie (complete with a RMD monogram) to ‘stimulate pride in the school’ (RMD, n.d., p. 22), and when the Para Hills Kindergarten was opened a few years later it was aptly named the Liberman Kindergarten after RMD’s Managing Director.

In another example of RMD fostering community activity, the Para Hills Progress Association was formed under the guidance and support of Liberman and his company’s sales staff. As noted, the developer placed considerable importance on encouraging such community participation for the general good of the community’s viability and perhaps also due to foreseeing limits on the extent to which RMD could

*Figure 4*

Source: Published by kind permission of The Advertiser.

*Figure 5*
Site of the proposed shopping centre on Wilkinson Road, early 1960s (f. Redhead Photograph)

Source: Salisbury Library Local History Collection, LH Para Hills 1 Town Planning 00018

*Figure 6*
"Laying the foundations of the Para Hills Community Club", early 1960s (f. Crocketer Photograph)

Source: Salisbury Library Local History Collection, LH Para Hills West 1 Building 00001
provide support and facilities. The Progress Association was officially launched in March 1961. Keen to set to work, it made a long list of tasks including campaigning for a decent telephone service, for an external and an internal bus service and for names for Para Hills’ streets (Storer interview, Side B).

The largest project tackled by the Progress Association was the ‘fund-raising and groundwork’ (City of Salisbury, 1985, p. 17) needed to establish the Para Hills Community Club. Initially canvassing Para Hills’ residents to test the viability of a Community Club, the Progress Association proceeded to raise funds on a grand scale to alleviate the need to borrow to finance the venture. The fundraising culminated in a lottery that raised nearly £20,000 towards the cost of building for the new Club, with the prize being a trip for two to England (Redhead interview, Side A). A two-acre site was purchased from the SAHT on the western boundary of the suburb [Figure 6] The Para Hills Community Club was officially opened on 14 June 1969 (City of Salisbury, 1985). While RMD was not involved formally in its formation and development, the Club’s success and that of the community overall, can be partly attributed to the RMD vision for a vibrant community, as one homeowner explained: “people that came to Para Hills couldn’t move once they got here, they had to stay...the most important thing about new communities, is how they cling together for support” (Storer interview, Side A, p. 6).

RMD sold 66 houses in the first five months of operation at Para Hills and a further 75 during the following financial quarter – a trend defying the decline of approvals in the private building industry in South Australia at the time (RMD, “Free Enterprise”). During the first 20 months after the Estate opened, RMD sold an average of 25 houses a month. If that trend had continued Para Hills would have been completed two years ahead of schedule – a remarkable effort for a five-year project. However, during the course of my research I have been unable to uncover whether these predictions were proven correct. The lack of available records may be attributed to the fact that RMD struck financial difficulties between 1962 and 1964, and was succeeded by Realty Development Corporation (SA) Pty Ltd (RDC). RDC completed the Para Hills project in accord with RMD’s vision and intentions and went on to develop other sites in metropolitan and regional South Australia.

The legacy of the Para Hills Estate RMD’s success in initiating and developing the Para Hills Estate can be examined in many ways. One is through those who made Para Hills their home. The commitment by homebuyers during the post-war reconstruction period should not be under-rated – those who bought a RMD home at Para Hills in the early 1960s were largely the makers not only of their new home, but also the creators of a vibrant local community. Another means of identifying the suburb’s success is in its legacy; Para Hills became a thriving community well past the boundaries of the original estate that extended beyond the era of its early settlement (O’Hanlon, n.d.).

Para Hills survives today. Suburban development has continued well past the boundaries of the original suburb, making it a smaller component of the greater metropolitan area north of Adelaide. The built fabric has stood the test of time, with most of the original development extant. The facilities provided by RMD are largely still in use. The shopping centre remains a contemporary face lift to ensure its viability in an ever-increasing consumer world. The primary school and kindergarten also continue to operate. The Para Hills Community Club continues as a core component of local community activity, and is part of The Paddocks, an expansive open recreational area for residents.

RMD’s contribution to housing provision in metropolitan Adelaide during the period of post-war reconstruction was significant. Its visionary ideas of providing for a self-contained community were uncommon locally at the time. Homebuyers were introduced to a range of both conventional and contemporary style housing with modern conveniences all part of the package with an RMD home. The latest trends in modern living were demonstrated through model homes, decorated in keeping with ideas from overseas and with outdoor living areas designed to suit the Adelaide climate. The resulting development of Para Hills is testimony to RMD’s foresight of the needs and desires of homebuyers in post-war Adelaide. Australians still hold strong the value of home ownership, and the legacy of lifestyle and convenience that suburban developments such as Para Hills afforded continues today.

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The 100-metre-wide Road in the Reconstruction of Bombed Cities in Japan

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In recent years a few important historical studies in English into urban reconstruction in Japan after the Second World War have emerged. One striking feature of reconstruction planning of bombed cities in Japan is the 100-metre-wide road. According to the official record of war-damage reconstruction in Japan compiled by the Ministry of Construction, there were in total sixteen 100-metre wide roads officially sanctioned as part of the proposed war-damage reconstruction projects in large cities such as Tokyo, Yokohama, Kawasaki, Nagoya, Osaka and Hiroshima, but in the end only three of them, two in Nagoya and one in Hiroshima, were actually materialised. It should be noted that, for instance in British war-damage reconstruction, the width of 100 feet would be regarded outrageous. As Anthony Sutcliffe points it out, while these 100-metre wide roads would naturally attract much interest among planning historians over the world, there is an acute need for 'much more explanation' about various aspects of them, for, admittedly, the recent historical studies mentioned above fail to give answers for such questions as the origin of the idea of 100-metre wide road, the reason why it had to be 100 metre, and the reasons why Hiroshima and Nagoya could materialise the proposed 100-metre wide streets while the other cities could not. Moreover, a smaller, provincial city other than the six mentioned above contemplated 100-metre wide roads at the initial planning stage. As Yorifusa Ishida points it out in his reputed chronicle of modern Japanese town planning, Toyama, the city in the central northern area of mainland Japan with the population of 130000 in 1940, made up a plan embracing 200-metre wide roads immediately after the heavy bombing in August 1945; but very little is known how and why they were planned. This article tries to fill the vacuum in our knowledge about 100-metre wide road and ascertain its significance in the history of Japanese town planning.

The idea of 100-metre wide road

The idea of constructing wide streets for fire-preventive purposes has a long history in Japan. Odorikoen in Sapporo, capital city of northern island of Hokkaido with a population of 1,900000 in 2007, exemplifies the case. The building of the city on the wilderness started in 1871 to provide a frontline base against Russia and for the opening up of undeveloped Hokkaido for the newly founded Meiji government, and Odorikoen was planned as an axis and a fire-preventive line. Its actual width is 105 metres or 58 ken. One ken is approximately 1.8 metres and the street was supposed to be 60 ken wide, but it is understood that there had been certain mistakes in the building process. The idea of providing wide streets for fire-preventive purposes naturally became all the more closely associated with national defense as the country accelerated its militarism. For one, Hideaki Ishikawa, doyen in the Japanese town planning circles who was to make the war-damage reconstruction plan for Tokyo, envisaged a triumphal boulevard of 100-metre width in the central Tokyo in his book Kokabo to Toshokukan (National Defense and Town Planning) published in 1944, anticipating the country’s victory in the Second World War.

Meanwhile, compulsory evacuation, namely, the pulling down of buildings forced by the local authorities in order to make room for fire-preventive belts of 50- or 100-metre wide, started in Tokyo in 1943. A number of cities followed suit and all told 610000 buildings in 279 cities had been demolished by the end of the war. Some of the cities which actually escaped heavy bombing such as Kyoto, Kurita, Onomichi and Fukushima made the most of wartime compulsory evacuation after the war to make room for wide thoroughfares, parks or car parks. Also it is now well known that the route of the 100-metre wide road of Hiroshima closely follows a belt of open space created by compulsory evacuation. However, the principal planner of the reconstruction plan for Hiroshima laid bare his bitter memories about the compulsory evacuation almost fifty years later in the record of war-damage reconstruction of the city. Teizo Takeshige, head of town planning section of Hiroshima Prefecture, protested against the Prefectural Governor’s order to commence compulsory evacuation in the city in May 1945 when it seemed too late to make any effective preparedness against air-rafts which had already started. The Governor, admitting that Takeshige’s opinion was ‘common-sense’, gave a strict order to work on it, however ‘nonsensical’ it might be, in the emergency. Takeshige felt in his bones that the military authorities put pressure. As he went on to say, ‘then the crazy evacuation started’. In any event, while exactly who was the first to advocate the figure of 100 is yet to be ascertained, the concept of 100-metre wide road gained momentum as part and parcel of air-defense town planning following...
Article

The modification of the Town Planning Act in 1940. At the same time, any decisive, scientific grounds for the figure of 100 are yet to be found. In the spring of 1941, several months before the country opened hostilities against the U.S.A. and the U.K., Noritomo Okuda, a technical staff member of Tokyo Local Town Planning Committee which, as an organ of the Home Ministry, possessed de facto authority to sanction town planning schemes for Tokyo, wrote an article entitled Boku Koro (Air-defense Thoroughfare) for the journal of Japan Road Engineering Association. He argued anticipating air-raids on Japan in pressing future, that roads were indispensable not only for defence, and the width of those which would be used for such purposes as fire-prevention, places of refuge, and so on should be substantial, adding that in particular the width of representative wide roads, namely, air-defense thoroughfares, should be more than 80 to 100 metres. While he calculated the figure of 40 metres as the smallest width which could escape fire by radiant heat of 300 centigrade degree in the flat calm, he did not present any concrete grounds why the figure of 80 to 100 should be adopted.1

Tatsuo Matsui, another technical staff member of the planning section of the Home Ministry immediately after the war, went so far as to say later that the figure of 100 was taken 'for the sake of being exactly 100'.2 He also testified that the idea of 100-metre wide road was 'utterly an invention of Hiroshima and Nagoya' and that the ministry was 'overwhelmed' by the local enthusiasm asking to accept the proposals. However, the Basic Policy Principle for the Planned Reconstruction of War-damaged areas which prescribed the government's instructions for local authorities to make reconstruction plans and was adopted by the cabinet on 30th December 1945, three months after the offer of the possible need to provide wide roads or open spaces of 50- or 100-metre wide for fire-prevention or aesthetic considerations.3 In fact this reference is to be found in a draft of the Basic Policy Principle for the Planned Reconstruction of War-damaged areas, dated 8th October 1945.4 Matsui was perhaps not necessarily keen on providing wide thoroughfares for fire-preventive or aesthetic purposes, as he put it in an article immediately after the end of the war that the width of principal road for a large city should be 50 metre based on the postwar traffic census.5

Reasons for success or failure to materialise 100-metre wide road

Indeed, it should be remembered that four large cities other than Nagoya and Hiroshima made proposals for 100-metre wide roads. Why, then, these four failed to materialise their proposals while Nagoya and Hiroshima succeeded? One significant point was how far the reconstruction projects had actually proceeded in each city by 1949 when the government axed the war-damage reconstruction projects which were far behind the schedule, as important part of deflationary policy packages. Tokyo was notoriously slow in the implementation of reconstruction projects not the least because Seichoiro Yasui, the Governor of Tokyo, regarded them as kind of luxuries in an economic plight, and he was determined to concentrate on restoring the everyday life of ordinary people rather than setting to ground zero reconstruction. Consequently, the capital was hit hardest by the government's curtailment in war-damage reconstruction, with all of the proposals for 100-metre wide road were abandoned.6

The two large cities in Kanagawa Prefecture, Kawasaki and Yokohama, had reasons which were alleged to have caused delays in reconstruction. Kawasaki returned the Ministry of Construction in 1950, maintaining that the grants from the government was insufficient, when the ministry, in considering the curtailment of war-damage reconstruction, gave a rebuke that the city had shown few signs of being earnestly committed to the task.7 Yokohama city had to face uncertainties in setting to reconstruction more than any other bombed cities, in that 16 square kilometres, approximately three fourths of land of Naka Ward which constituted the central area of the city, was requisitioned by the Occupation Forces. The area amounted to 62 per cent of land requisitioned in the country as a whole (excluding Okinawa). On top of this the financial difficulties and shortage of materials, phenomena common to bombed cities, made the realisation of the proposed two 100-metre wide roads which were supposed to cater for the industrial area near the harbour impossible.8

Osaka did not make remarkable initial progress in reconstruction either, and was told by the government in 1949 to reconsider the proposed two 100-metre wide roads. Of particular importance was the fact that Osaka, which preferred prudent approach to reconstruction, was forced to end the plan 16 metre wide roads immediately after the war, simply because Tokyo and Nagoya had theirs in their plans. The planner for the Osaka plan, head of the planning section of the city, understandably became furious when the city was told to reconsider the proposals.9 Against these, Nagoya was certainly making smooth progress in reconstruction, especially in land readjustment projects, namely, the regrouping and redividing of land to create new public space for roads, parks, and so on, so that there was little room for the government to make curtailment of the original reconstruction proposals in the late 1940s. Credit for remarkable progress has been given to Juro Tabuchi, superintendent for all the engineering affairs of the city, who has been praised as man of action and determination in tackling the difficult task. It has been also pointed out that Nagoya, capital of Aichi Prefecture, had a long tradition of being imbued with the desire for important reconstruction projects which would often involve loss of premises to owners or tenants. The enlightenment was led by Hideaki Ishikawa when he worked for Aichi Local Town Planning Committee before the war.10 However, there seems to be left some room for a second thought, for, Tabuchi himself later admitted that the land readjustment was carried out in the midst of confusion and in the absence of many of former inhabitants immediately after the war so as not to let the opportunity slip. As he went on, 'it was taking merciless, drastic measures, but otherwise you would never accomplish town planning.'11

Hiroshima was perhaps little better than other bombed cities in the progress of reconstruction, but a special status given to it as the victim of atomic bomb made it possible to materialise some distinguished features of its reconstruction plan including the 100-metre wide roads. Of particular importance was the Hiroshima Peace Memorial City Construction Act of 1949, by which it was expected that the government would give favourable treatment of the city's reconstruction. Under the Act, the 100-metre wide road and the Peace Memorial Park it would flanked were selected as a special area embodying the spirit of peace, into which financial and other resources should be poured. Thus the 100-metre wide road was proposed to be renamed a peace memorial road in 1951 to give it symbolic significance.12

As mentioned above, Toyama also made a proposal for 100-metre wide roads following the heavy bombing immediately before the end of the war. However, Yoshimi Chikaishi, head of the planning section of Toyama Prefecture who forwarded the proposal, made it clear in recollection that he presented the idea virtually on the 10th of the moment. He could not see eye to eye with the Governor of the Prefecture whom he seemed to regard as an inconsiderate, bossy person. Chikaishi thought that the first thing to do after the bombing should be to calm down and cheer up the citizens, but that seemed to be the last thing one could expect of the Governor. In such a situation, he somehow just put down 100-metre wide roads upon the Governor's strict order to make a reconstruction plan. The central part of these roads would be reserved for cultivation. Chikaishi did not bother about how to obtain land for these roads, simply thinking that compulsory acquisition should pose no problem. Once the war was over, he suddenly became realistic and concerned about rights of owners and tenants. He once again made a reconstruction plan, but this time it was a rather conservative one with the largest width of roads being 36 metres. Indeed he 'desperately needed directions from the ministry proper', and the ministry officials actually modified his plan on a bolder line with the largest width of roads being 50 metres.13

Conclusion

It could be said that the concept of 100-metre wide road had a prewar origin of planning for fire-preventive and aesthetic purposes and gained momentum as part and parcel of national defense. Usually, traffic lanes would be around 15 metres wide, while two thirds of the entire width would be devoted to green spaces. It was a very bold, idealistic concept that generated much enthusiasm in the planning circles, and this enthusiasm came to fade after the initial idealist approach to war-damage reconstruction, even though concrete scientific grounds for the figure of 100 were hardly shown. The failure to materialise them indicated that the concept was either too idealistic or not well-grounded enough to be realistic. The successful cases highlighted the exceptional circumstances not to be expected in other bombed cities. Either way, the 100-metre wide road represented a microcosm of dreams and difficulties of war-damage reconstruction in Japan.

Notes

3. For the author's view of British war-damage reconstruction, see J. Hasegawa, Replanning the Blitzed City Centre: A comparative study of Bristol, Coventry and Southampton 1941-1950 (Buckingham and Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1992), and the government expert bodies in the physical reconstruction of the City of London in the 1940s, Planning Perspectives (1999), vol.14, no.2, 'The Rise and Fall

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Reconstructing Skopje after the 1963 earthquake: The Master Plan forty years on

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Introduction: "unique in the history of town planning"

What strikes you most about the city is the weighty communist paw in its design. Most of the city was rebuilt after an earthquake in 1960s' communist concrete style. In about fifty years or so pundits may well be raving about this superb period ensemble of concrete apartment towers, vast avenues suitable for tank parades and weird space age public buildings. To the current eye, though, it might seem a tad ugly.

The author, who might claim to be one such pundit, worked during January-July 2006 in Macedonia, for a training project on local government, and this article is a by-product, an opportunity to revisit the Skopje Master Plan. While there is considerable work by planning historians on reconstruction after the Second World War, there is much less on reconstruction after natural disasters, post-war Socialist planning in eastern Europe, or master planning.

The Skopje master plan was something of a high-water mark for master planning by the architect-planners of the modern movement. It also reflects a time when the United Nations was keen to show its potential for promoting international co-operation when world affairs were difficult: 1963 was the year of the Cuban missile crisis and the assassination of President Kennedy. For the people of Skopje themselves, the city's reconstruction was as momentous an event as its destruction: when Skopje school-children were asked in the 1990s to write an essay on 'A major event in the life of my town', 80% chose to write about the Master Plan rather than the earthquake.

The earthquake and the international response

Skopje has a long history, with more than its share of misfortunes (invasions, fires, and earthquakes recorded in 518 and 1505). The city was mainly located on the left (northern) bank of the River Vardar (which flows into Greece) in the Ottoman period, and was divided into ethnic quarters. The railway from Themistoklis (and with it modern urban planning) arrived in the 1870s, concentrating new development on the right (southern) bank. The Balkan war of 1912 ended Ottoman rule, and the city's population grew rapidly (80,000 in 1931, 82,000 in 1945, 171,000 in 1961). After the Second World War Skopje became the administrative and industrial centre for the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and the fourth largest city in Yugoslavia.

At 5.17 am on 26 July 1963 Skopje was struck by a short, sharp and very destructive earthquake, which in seconds left over a thousand people dead, three thousand injured, and 150,000 homeless. The tectonic plate had shifted in one piece, leaving underground utilities and the railway largely unaffected. Some modern buildings still had windows unbroken, yet had been physically displaced several centimetres from their original position, with only diagonal cracks revealing the extent of structural damage. Most public buildings were destroyed, and, while much of the city afterward appeared largely intact, a third of the buildings left standing (some of them only recently occupied) had to be demolished. The existing housing stock was afterwards assessed to have lost 65% of its technical value, and only 1 in 40 dwellings remained fit for occupation. Worst affected were the older mud brick and mixed construction buildings, whose foundations had been weakened by a river flood the previous year.
The Yugoslav government responded quickly and effectively to the immediate emergency: the army moved in with field hospitals and tents, while the peasants from the countryside delivered their fruit and vegetables as usual the next day, leaving them on the ground without looking for payment. Yugoslavia was a non-aligned country, well-regarded by the international community in the Cold War period.

The UN General Assembly encouraged a massive international response, both to the immediate needs and for longer-term reconstruction. Rescue squads of miners came from Croatia; within a day the US sent a 120-bed field hospital from Berlin. Foreign assistance was eventually given by 77 countries and eventually was estimated to have contributed as much as the Yugoslav government itself. British involvement included a visit by the UN adviser Kenneth Watts in late 1963, professional advice from a specialist in repairing blitzed buildings (T.Whitley Moran, civil and structural engineer of Liverpool firm Moran & Long), and expertise in prefabricated housing (R.Fitzmaurice). A nine-ton block of Skopje marble was shipped to Liverpool as the altar-stone for the new Roman Catholic cathedral.

In the early months there was serious debate about whether future earthquake risk justified abandoning Skopje altogether, but the capital investment in infrastructure was considered too great to write off. Also the city was seen as ‘a symbol of the brotherhood and unity of the equal and free peoples of Yugoslavia’, and soon became seen as a symbol of international fellowship; among that monuments proposed was one to ‘Liberty and International Fellowship’.

‘Skopje’s symbolic significance, for Macedonia, for Yugoslavia and for a troubled world, had become so great that the basic decision to rebuild it as a model of all that city planning could be was a foregone conclusion’.

Determined to promote the appliance of science to earthquakes, Skopje became home to a new International Institute of Seismic Engineering, supported by the United Nations. Within a year this was soon offering a two-year postgraduate course in earthquake engineering, and producing model regulations for earthquake-resistant building standards. The Master Plan: process

A month after the earthquake the Yugoslav government, with UNESCO support, created an international consultative board, which met in 1964 at the Macedonian lake resort of Ohrd. As its chairman said, ‘the finest scientific and technical expertise of the entire world will be demonstrated in the reconstruction of Skopje’. Following new rules for international architectural/planning competitions, the board approved the outline plan by Doxiadis Associates as the main planning contractor, with Polish planners providing professional services and the comprehensive physical plan.

The Skopje City Council created in 1964 a Town Planning Department (the first in Macedonia), working closely with the national Institute of Town Planning and Architecture, and including surveying and geological sections to advise the planners. A project manager for the master plan who combined professional and managerial responsibility was appointed by the UN in 1964; Adolf Chłorowski, chief architect of Warsaw, who had worked on the reconstruction of that city after it was 85% destroyed in the Second World War. Kole Jordanovski directed the operation for the local authorities, and some sixty international experts eventually worked on the reconstruction projects, with a similar number of Yugoslav professionals. The Skopje City Council approved a ‘definitive outline plan’ in October 1964, and a year later the master planners’ work was presented at ‘the most comprehensive town planning exhibition ever staged in Yugoslavia’; visited by 10,000 people a week. Formal adoption of the Master Plan followed a month later, on 16 November 1965. The UN Special Fund also supported six related projects: the carrying out of three surveys (social, buildings condition, and regional), and special studies on housing, transport and infrastructure.

The Master Plan was considered at the time innovative in its fast-track approach. ‘Never before had a town planning exercise of such magnitude and complexity been conducted under the pressure of such desperately urgent social needs’.

The usual master plan process (survey-analysis-plan) was telescoped in time, requiring constant decision-making. The key management tool was a ‘Professional Working Committee’ which met weekly as a high-level group to sort out problems and maintain a common appreciation of the collective task, it often involved conflicting professional opinions and cultural values among international experts, but ultimately the system worked. There were problems of accommodating the process within hierarchical government structures, and a ‘rigidly legalistic interpretation of what were meant to be general guidelines’.

The Master Plan: content

The master planners’ work was guided by the recommendations of the international jury, which included the following: a dispersed pattern of development, the river Vardar to be a unifying element, the setting of Kale Hill (the highest natural feature) not to be diminished by high-rise buildings, the Carsija district to be integrated with the centre (not allowed to become a “tourist museum piece’), and only low-rise housing to be allowed on the left bank.

The planners, enthusiastic for surveys, established that Skopje before the earthquake had some 36,000 housing units, accommodating nearly 200,000 people in nearly 50,000 households, at an average of 1.3 families per dwelling and 5.5 people per household. Average dwelling size was 44 sq m or 8 sq m per person. The earthquake made 80,000 homeless, with a further 70,000 living in heavily damaged buildings. Such was the pressure on housing stock that in 1981 160,000 people were still living in ‘retained housing’ (ie earthquake) rather than new homes.

The Master Plan envisaged several time-frames: short-term (a population target of 270,000 by 1971), medium-term (350,000 by 1981) and long-term (4 million, after 2000). It aimed to combine a larger population with reduced average household size (from 4.15 in 1964 to 3.5 in 1981) and better space standards (12.5 sq m per person, soon raised to 17.5). This required nearly doubling the 1964 housing stock (25,000 more dwellings by 1971, 63,000 by 1981), all to be financed from public funds. National population growth was estimated at 2% pa, to which was added immigration in search of jobs in reconstruction. The survey of post-earthquake building condition was soon criticised for condemning too many buildings to demolition, and had to be revised. Dwellings of ‘adobe’ construction were especially targeted for sham clearance (seen as an essential prerequisite for redevelopment), and many self-built post-earthquake dwellings were also demolished in the central area reserved for future high-value development.

Socialist planning principles placed all land under state control, so that little regard was paid to private market land values or private developers. Skopje was fortunate in having ample potential development land, the so-called ‘Skopje Field’ (or valley floor), comprising an area of 33x10 kilometres. The application of Polish threshold and optimisation analysis techniques resulted in an ‘area of search’ of 9000 ha for new housing development, which was reduced to 4200 ha after seismically unsuitable land was excluded. Only 1000 ha was needed, so there was ample space to accommodate the planned development in a dispersed pattern. The development area was divided into 280 ‘land-area units’ for calculating total development costs, and eight zones for compensation calculation purposes. Development land was allocated where development costs (ie costs of infrastructure and utilities) were lowest. So-called ‘expansion barriers’ around the city were set, as a threshold which could not be passed without incurring increased development costs (assuming, for example, a bus system with maximum of 45-minute travel time between home and work).

Following contemporary design orthodoxy, neighbourhood units were planned for 6000 population, based upon primary school distribution.

Most of the new housing was initially placed in the Aerodrom area (a disused airfield), where a new municipality for 80,000 inhabitants was created. The
planners created a four-grade hierarchy of units and centres, with three district centres planned around a main city centre, intended to serve a city of 0.7 million. Net residential densities were set at 540 persons per hectare, and to achieve the rapid house-building rate, industrialised and prefabricated methods were applied, with the USSR donating a factory for pre-cast concrete prefabrication; Skopje already had a cement factory and steel works.

A strategic transport decision was made to base the city's future mass movement needs upon the bus (rather than train or car). A low car ownership rate was assumed, with the pre-cast concrete prefabrication; Skopje already had a cement factory and steel works. A strategic transport decision was made to base the city's future mass movement needs upon the bus (rather than train or car). A low car ownership rate was assumed, with the pre-cast concrete prefabrication; Skopje already had a cement factory and steel works.

The railway network was also replanned. The partly-destroyed railway station was left as a monument to the earthquake, containing the city museum. The rail-track in that part of town was removed to allow road traffic from the southern suburbs on the slopes of Mount Vodno to avoid 'a weary wait at a level-crossing that must frequently be closed to let shunting engines shepherd their wagons higher and lower'. A new central station was located east of the city centre (driven by regional rather than local economic needs), and was later added under the station (opened in 1971), which replaced the small Jewish bridge and formed a major road link to the Belgrade motorway.

The Vardar River itself was an important part of the Master Plan. Before the earthquake Snow-meltwaters, which had weakened building foundations, Geological studies of seismic risk found that riverside lands should be kept free of development. Once the unruly river itself had been channelled, the banks were kept building-free and used for recreational purposes: parks, playing fields, sport stadia and riverside walks. New bridges were built, notably the Gose Delcev bridge (opened in 1971), which replaced the smaller Jewish bridge and formed a major road link to the Belgrade motorway. Upriver the Matka I dam and hydro-electric station were built, controlling the flow of the river, and providing for canoe-slam and other recreational activities.

The earthquake also resulted in the first regional plans to be made in Yugoslavia, undertaken mainly by Polish professional experts. The key strategic question was whether to keep industrial development in Skopje or to decentralise, and eventually a mixed solution was adopted. The Macedonian republic was already receiving the largest share of such investment in Yugoslavia, and the allocated reconstruction funds were estimated to be four times that needed to restore pre-earthquake production levels. The Master Plan proposed an expansion of Skopje's eastern industrial zone (including the large Zelezara steel works), while the existing industrial area immediately east of the city centre was largely cleared for a future extension of the centre. Industrial employment was expected to grow 50% by 1971 and a further 10% by 1981, and was to be shared with three satellite towns, while 'cultural resources' directed to six other towns. The city centre on the right bank was allocated for administration, commerce, shopping and entertainment. A third of the area was zoned for housing (30,000 people), and the city core was enclosed by so-called 'city walls' of high-density slab-block housing; seismic precautions required the height of the city wall to be reduced from that originally designed. Traffic was to be funnelled through a 'city gate', supposed to serve as an administrative 'citadel', where the Macedonian Telecommunications and Post Office buildings ('a futuristic, insect-like structure', according to Lonely Planet) now stand. The existing business-residential area around Marshal Tito Street
and linking to the old railway station was reconstructed and infilled. A new Shopping Centre by the river was completed in 1973, with spacious cafe terraces (25m wide) along the river bank, and a large city square (100x165 metres) showing the Stone Bridge.

Social engineering

The Skopje master planners were self-confident social engineers. The prevailing planning ideology favoured rehousing 'slum inhabitants', respecting their different cultural traditions, but working towards a progressive levelling up of living standards and integration into a homogenous society adapted to modern urban life.

The Ottomans had segregated communities in a multi-ethnic city, and the post-war Yugoslav Constitution guaranteed minority rights. Within a few months of the earthquake a social survey was undertaken (a new venture for Yugoslavia), using 85 university students to interview 4000 families at home. These minority communities were mainly concentrated on the left bank in the 'Old Town' (known to the planners as Town B), where dwellings tended to be older, households more crowded (only 7 sq.m. floorspace per person), and incomes lower. In the simplistic planners' analysis, the Turks were seen as attaching greater importance to privacy of family life, while the Gypsies 'gregarious', offering a good chance to lay a grid of streets.

The break-up of Yugoslavia resulted in the creation of a smaller Republic of Macedonia in 1992 (Kosovo being separated, and now falling under a NATO mandate). The planning of Skopje's reconstruction proved to be the beginning of a continuing UN involvement in the region. The three municipalities of Skopje in 1963 contained 312,000 inhabitants in 1963, in 152 villages, of whom 220,000 lay within the Master Plan area. Subsequent local government reorganisations divided Skopje into seven municipalities (1996), subsequently ten, under a City Assembly and Mayor to coordinate. The city now has about half a million inhabitants.

Relatively little of pre-earthquake Skopje now survives, and its older residents express regret that the old city was swept away so comprehensively, as much by the master planners as the earthquake itself, destroying something of the soul of the city. Some of the prefabricated housing from the immediate first phase of reconstruction has survived, notably in the Tafahdzic quarter, and buildings 'retro-fitted' with earthquake reinforcement are still to be seen. But little remains of the old city, often just some of the old cobbled streets preserving the historic street pattern, and this is reflected in the poor integration of the two sides of the river, the Carsija area being separated from the town centre by a major road and the wide building set-backs from the river bank.

The Master Plan was a creature of its time. Architect-planners of the modern movement, confident in their role of remaking the postwar world, worked with the state rather than with the people (who were 'consulted' by being allowed to view the scale model of the new city whose planners had fashioned it). Planning orthodoxy followed the recognised principles of the day: dispersed settlement in neighbourhood units; separation of land uses; priority to industry and the motor vehicle; preservation limited to some public buildings rather than area conservation; large-scale slum clearance for high-density housing, and hierarchies of service centres. It left a legacy of submissive public attitudes, possible linked to centuries of Ottoman subjugation - an expectation that the state and its technocrats will dictate solutions. This was far removed from a Thatcherite world of private enterprise and minimal state intervention. The state regulated the built environment in detail, and only in recent years has the planning thinking recognised the role of private development within flexible development guidelines.

To return to the Lonely Planet judgment (this superb phrase ensemble), Skopje is well worth a visit for a planning historian, as a fully realised example of an era of master planning and international co-operation in reconstructing after a natural disaster. In the words of Kenneth Watts it was 'the first major international collaborative exercise of this magnitude to prepare a development plan for a sizeable city'.

Acknowledgments

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Footnotes

1 United Nations Development Programme (1970), Skopje Resurgent: The Story of a United Nations Special Fund Town Planning Project United Nations, New York (flyleaf). This book of nearly 400 pages, largely compiled by the British planner Derek Senser, celebrated the UNDP's work in planning Skopje's reconstruction, and was an important source for this article.


In present day Malaysia, town planning is widely regarded as having its beginnings in 1921, the year in which the government of the Federated Malay States (FMS) secured the services of Charles Compton Reade (1880-1933), initially on a temporary basis, as Government Town Planner. Prior to his engagement in the FMS, Reade was stationed in Adelaide, South Australia, where he had worked for four years as Adviser on Town Planning and, from April 1918, as Government Town Planner (Tregerzus, 1981). His secondment to the FMS on the handsome salary of £2000 was intended as a nine-to-twelve-month appointment but was extended to a three-year contract in 1921 and converted to a permanent position in 1924.

During a brief period as a journalist in the 1910s, New Zealand born Reade came into contact with the town planning movement and with Ebenezer Howard's garden city idea. Embracing both concepts, he turned to a career as a self-educated town planner and an advocate of town planning 'on garden city lines'. Initially connected with the Garden Cities and Town Planning Association in London, on whose behalf he co-organised the Australasian Town Planning Tour of 1914 (Freestone, 1998), his FMS appointment marked the beginning of two decades of employment with the British Colonial Office. Post-Malaya, Reade was based in Livingstone, Northern Rhodesia, and in South Africa. He died in Johannesburg in October 1933 shortly after taking up the role of Chief Town Planning Officer with the Witwatersrand Joint Town Planning Committee (Mabin, 1993).

This paper focuses on aspects of Reade's application in Malaya of re-planning and redistribution of lots (as against sub-division), prevention of haphazard development through the mechanism of the General Town Plan, and his application of garden city design principles. A few sites (previously unknown) where he applied such methods and principles are illustrated and discussed. A survey of the social, political and economic background provides a deeper appreciation of forces working against Reade's town planning intentions in the 1920s. In that decade Malaya experienced an economic slump (1921-1923) which precipitated calls for retribution of British government employees; it was followed by a short period of economic improvement that peaked in 1926. Thereafter the country suffered economic decline that steadily worsened leading to numerous retrenchments in 1933 (Turnbull 1989). This paper alludes to the working of the town planning legislation that Reade drafted, as this has been widely published by various historians (in particular Meng et al 1990, Goh Ban Lee 1991, Home 1997, Bristow 2000, Shamsudin 2005). Principal research materials include: Annual Reports of the Government Town Planner; Proceedings of the Federal Council of the FMS, contemporary newspapers, archival records held in Britain and Malaysia, and published sources. The authors' field work also informs the paper.

Background
Britain became actively involved in the governance of Malaya in 1874. By then it had an established connection with the region through its administration of the adjacent territories of Singapore, Penang and Malacca. Located on the western seaboard of the Malay Peninsula, the Straits Settlements were well-placed along the China-India trade route. Civil wars, meagre local administration and poor economic growth eventually led Britain to bring four of the Malay States – Selangor, Perak, Pahang and Negri Sembilan – under its protection. A Resident was appointed to each to advise the local Sultan and his chiefly on all matters except Malay religion and customs, to perform a variety of roles from magistrate to treasurer, and to work with the Malay Rulers to lay the foundations of local government (Morrohead, 1963).

After some years the efficiency and economy of the separate states model was strongly questioned and consequently, on 1 July 1896, the four states under Resident control were amalgamated as the Federated Malay States (FMS). The intention was 'to secure uniformity [between them] in matters such as justice, taxation, and land-settlement, as well as to plan communications on a wider basis' (Kennedy, 1970, p. 236). The four states were centralised and co-ordinated by a Resident-General (formerly Chief Secretary from 1909) who liaised with individual
British Residents, appointed to each state, and with the Malay Rulers. The Resident-General reported to the Singapore-based High Commissioner of the Malay States (who was also Governor of the Straits Settlements). The remaining five Malay States— Johore, Trengganu, Kelantan, Kedah and Perlis constituted the Federated Malay States (UMS). Although subject to British advice and protection, the UMS retained their autonomy and were administered by their own State Councils.

The FMS were centrally located and occupied about half of the Malay Peninsula (Kennedy, 1970). They proved to be the key centres for the rich tin and mining industries that underpinned the Malay economy and attracted people seeking quick financial gain. Additionally, Malaya was a racially mixed country (Guillick, 2000) comprising indigenous Malays and immigrant groups—primarily Chinese, Indians and Europeans (predominantly British). The FMS demographics reflected this diversity, as the 1921 Census population figures demonstrate: Malaya—510,821; Chinese—494,548; Indians—305,219; Europeans—5866; Eurasians—3204; Others—5412 (Nathan cited in Wah, 1982, p. 32).

Europeans were mainly British in the roles of ‘ruling, owning and managing’ (Wah, 1982, p. 33). They were members of the Malay Civil Service. Although the Chinese dominated immigrant numbers in the urban centres, most were based in rural areas where they worked in the mining and rubber industries or on mixed farms. The Malays were generally agriculturalists while the Indians worked as labourers. The FMS placed in its hands. Dismayed at the turn of events, the Executive Council was established as a vehicle for the Malay Rulers as well as to the ‘Unofficials’ (key British and non-British community members) and to the colonial administration through its members, known as ‘Officials’.

The Federal Council met annually. The High Commissioner and the Resident-General had power of veto but the Sultans did not. Officials were in the majority. The Council became the chief policy-making body and in 1910 financial control of the FMS was placed in its hands. Dismayed at the turn of events, the Sultans agitated for the restoration of their own State Councils’ powers. At the same time a group of younger British Officials was critical of the loss of the states’ autonomy and keen to promote the Malay right to self-rule. So began a long period of policy review that extended to 1923. Driven by the principle that it was Britain’s ‘business to guide and direct the natural desire of human beings to be their own masters’—and to promote contentment’ (Milner cited in Gosh in Wah, 1982, p. 37), the Colonial Office came to favour decentralisation and an administrative system of indirect rule.

The politics of decentralization (Wah, 1982) in the 1920s led to what Guillick (2000, pp. 259-60) describes as ‘a protracted, and sometimes acrimonious debate, over proposals whereby powers would be transferred from the FMS federal centre to the state governments’. It resulted in role-shared power struggles and bitter personal conflict between key personnel, most notably the Governor and High Commissioner Laurence Guillemard and the Chief Secretary George Maxwell (Wah, 1982)—the former was a strong supporter of decentralisation while the latter preferred the retention of some form of centralisation. Town Planning being a centralised function was inadvertently affected shifting from a centralised legislature in 1923 to a decentralised legislature in 1927.

The early years of the decentralisation debate occurred in a time of severe economic slump that had commenced during World War I but worsened in the postwar period due to a dramatic fall in tin and rubber prices. Although Guillemard was informed when he came to office in 1920 that ‘there was lots of work to be done and plenty of money to do it with’ (Guillick, 1983, p. 139), by 1921 ‘Public finances were in crisis’ (Guillick, 2000, p. 245). Revenue was only half of the amount anticipated, affecting public works as well as administration. A Retrenchment Commission was established in 1922.

British officials proceeded with creating the Federal Department of Town Planning despite the milieu of policy shift and economic malaise. Members of the Federal Council had been agitating for the department for about a decade; W. F. Nutt recommended proposals for town planning needs in 1912 to the Federal Council (FMS Legislative Council Proceedings, 1912, p. 96). High Commissioner Guillemard specifically requested Charles Reade’s services to establish it, acknowledging that he came with ‘strong recommendation’ (Guillemard to Amery, 1927). Based in the FMS capital, Kuala Lumpur, in the State of Selangor, Reade was charged with the tasks of formulating town planning legislation and of rectifying haphazard urban development by preparing comprehensive planning schemes for Kuala Lumpur, Ipoh, the capital of the State of Perak, and other towns of the Federation. Indeed his services even extended to the UMS and British North Borneo (in particular after 1927).

The Federal Department of Town Planning

Guillick (2000, p. 246) suggests that the establishment of the Federal Department of Town Planning signalled the beginning of a ‘new era’. Limited town planning controls and regulations over land ownership had been in place since Britain took over the Malay Peninsula (Borneo and Town Planning Committees (TPCs) had previously undertaken the work that would come under the department’s jurisdiction. The first Sanitary Board was formed in Kuala Lumpur in 1889. Members of Boards included the heads of state departments—Medical, Public Works and Police—and influential representatives of the Malay and Chinese communities. Representatives of the Sanitary Boards and relevant departmental heads were members of TPCs. Sanitary Boards’ responsibilities ranged from health and hygiene to town maintenance, the construction and naming of streets and traffic regulation. They also oversaw building applications and town planning. However, in reality, despite seemingly wide control, ‘the board itself was little more than a coordinating committee, dependent on state departments, such as the PWD, to implement its decisions’ (Guillick, 2000, p. 246).

The Federal Department of Town Planning opened officially on 18 January 1921 (Shanmugas, 2005). Reade was assigned a limited staff—mostly supporting staff and one engineer on loan from the Public Works (and from the Survey Department a year later). One of his early tasks was to form a State (of Selangor) Advisory Town Planning Committee, chaired by the British Resident and with the authority to approve schemes proposed by the Town Planning Department. Members were from the main technical departments. Much was accomplished through this committee.

As was his custom (Garnaut, 2002), Reade was quick to apprise himself of local conditions. He undertook an immediate survey of the physical state of the FMS towns, reporting the results in Town Planning and Development in the Federated Malay States (1922). This important historical document (Lee, 1991) emphasised the need for prevention over cure, the difference between planning and subdividing and the economies that could be achieved under town planning. Further, it outlined requirements for the introduction of a permanent town planning machinery in Malaya and specifically for legislation to manage the growth of towns in an orderly manner.

The Town Planning Enactment, 1923

The Town Planning Enactment was passed in 1923 but did not come into effect until the end of 1924. It was aimed largely at rectifying mistakes in town layout such as the imprudent siting of industrial, residential, commercial and agricultural areas; the absence of a systematic road plan and of planning for urban growth, public purposes including recreation, and increased volume of traffic and housing density. It concentrated on eliminating the problem of a vast number of private investors holding adjacent small parcels of land; and at rectifying the Sanitary Board’s lack of legislative powers and control in town planning matters (Reade, 1922, 1923).

Reade (1927b) described the 1923 legislation as ‘preliminary and incomplete’ because of its passage during a period of economic constraint. It was made operational to allow permanent development departments and officers to proceed…[with] more extended legal powers to be enacted at a later stage.’ The Enactment created a Federal Town Planning Department headed by a permanent Government Town Planner. Separate Town Planning Committees (TPCs) were also established in each State and operated in parallel with the existing Sanitary Boards. The TPCs were not under Sanitary Board purview, ultimately an impediment to effective development. Although intended to promote greater coordination and control from Kuala Lumpur, the structure was seen to diminish the powers of the Sanitary Board, despite the chair of the Board being made TPC chair. Others (Meng et al., 1990; Lee, 1991; Bristow, 1996, 2000) have examined closely the
Re-planning and redistribution of lots

Reade advocated for the cure of physical urban problems through re-planning and redistribution of lots, and for prevention in the form of the preparation of a General Town Plan for existing and new areas. Although the former was not the ‘sole remedy by any means [it was] … economical and practical in the present circumstances of the country’ (Reade, 1922, p. 1), his concept of re-planning and redistribution was based on the successful German land pooling concept, ‘Lex Adickes’. Reade had investigated the application and outcomes of this highly plan-based system and written about it in his book, *The Revelation of Britain* (1909). However, this method was not a normal practice in Britain, although town planning schemes were; he combined both practices.

Reade’s proposed tools for curative measures in the form of compensation, betterment, and the sale, exchange, surrender and leasing of land, were incorporated into the Town Planning Enactment. Despite opposition from the Unofficials in the Federal Council (Meng et al., 1990; Brissow, 2000), the Enactment gained support because of assurances that the legislation would not burden the government financially and because it would be reviewed after a year of practical experience. Indeed, the review option was quickly taken up by the Enactment’s opponents. His argument that limited government financial expenditure would be required under the legislation, although still a consequence of economic situation, soon proved to be largely unworkable. There were several factors mitigating against its success: administrative complexities – administrators, land surveyors, and engineers all needed to be involved in implementing such schemes, suitable government land dwindled making exchanges difficult to realise; depreciation in the private property market (Garnaut, 1997) but, fundamentally, the lack of a “public interest” ideology amongst landowners. Reade (1926, p. 89) referred to the last as the major stumbling block: “The public welfare”, is a phrase foreign to … [landowners’] understanding or instincts. They lack the public spirit or interest in the development of the land, and usually act on the principle of “what I have I hold”; despite this Reade recorded numerous successes at re-planning and redistribution in his annual town planning report (1921-1929).

The attitude of the FMS government was another obstacle; although it appeared concerned with both the cure and prevention of urban ills, it was not committed to investing the necessary financial resources. A Federal Council member revealed that Reade’s work had been “severely hampered by the total lack of funds for the acquisition of land for purposes of town improvement” (Federal Council, 1926, p. B175). The absence of government money for constructing roads in new schemes was a recurrent complaint from landowners who frequently expressed their views publicly through the Times of Malaya and the Malay Mail. Reade (1926, p. 89) also remarked on their grumblings: ‘Invariably the first questions that landowners ask are (1) when will this road be constructed? and (2) who is to pay the cost of such construction, or (3) when will Government make the road, (implying that Public Funds will bear the cost of all future roads).’ Eventually it became clear that attempting to find a cure without government financial outlay in fact posed a greater obstacle to solving the issue.

The Kuala Lumpur General Town Plan

Reade had more success in introducing the concept of the General Town Plan, an anticipated and forward-looking approach to town development and growth. Intended to be gradually implemented, over many years, he regarded it as ‘indispensable to the promotion and substitution of orderly for disorderly development in new areas; also for adjusting parts of the older town to modern conditions of transport, commerce and convenience …’ (Reade, 1924, p. 1). The re-planning of Kuala Lumpur was a case in point (although the process was similarly applied to other towns).

Reade’s staff prepared a preliminary General Town Plan for Kuala Lumpur in 1924. The main scheme was subsequently divided into twenty-eight separate separated

Figure 1

Town Planning Schemes in Kuala Lumpur (Notes on population and planning schemes 1-28 by K. Shamsudin sourced from various Annual Reports of the Government Town Planner)

Figure 2

Redistribution of land near Jalan Bukit Bintang, Kuala Lumpur (before and after)

Source: Third Annual Report of Government Town Planner (1924)
kilometres from the capital. However, many smaller towns with government quarters were designed according to garden city principles.

**Imbi Village**

The Imbi Village housing scheme was introduced as a means of alleviating the government employee housing shortage in Kuala Lumpur following World War I. The village was designed in 1922 but built in two stages between 1923 and 1926. The triangular-shaped site was state-owned and covered eighty acres bounded by three major thoroughfares - Imbi, Pudu and Circular Roads. Close to an existing water supply and to established modes of transport, the Village was intended to be self-contained with 350 residential quarters as well as a school and playgrounds, a commercial precinct, and public open space that included a village green (Reade, 1927, 1924; Jencks, 1928; Garnaut, 2004) (Figure 3).

In the Imbi project, Reade intended to demonstrate the suitability of adopting 'the garden city practice of countries like British Malaya' (Reade quoted in 2006).

The preliminary plan was completed during 1926 (Reade, 1927). It was distinctive for its use of the topography, its implementation of the concept of zoning, and its inclusion of a parkbelt adjacent to the central shop-house zone. The parkbelt utilised lower lying reclaimed mining land and introduced an element that was designed for padangs (public reserves), cricket and golf. Reade expected that KKB would expand and left room for growth in the residential and commercial areas. Indeed, although the commercial core remains unchanged, expansion has occurred over time, the most recent being with various government educational and training institutions, and this is bordered by an extensive area of landscaped recreation space (Figure 5).

Kuala Kubu Baru (KKB)

The small town of KKB straddles the foothills of the mountain range of Malaya and is situated at the base of the road to the summer resort of Fraser's Hill. Unknown to most Malaysians, it is one of the best kept secrets of town planning designed in the tradition of the garden city movement. Planned from 1924, probably at the height of Reade's tenure and benefiting from the temporary economic boom of 1924-1926, it testifies to the lasting legacy of Reade's vocation in Malaya, and illustrates a time when comprehensive planning development was not the norm.

Residents of Kuala Kubu, the town that KKB replaced, were constantly worried as it was perennially flooded by the overflow of the Ampang Pechah River (Tate, 1987). Hence the site for a new town, Kuala Kubu Baru (Baru means 'new'), was selected up river, and on higher land. Some of the 333 acres of land was owned by the state, but most was purchased from private owners who had worked for tin. KKB was intended as an important administrative centre that housed the District Offices. Consequently local government department administrators as well as residents and commercial proprietors were involved in consultations over the location and layout of the new town. As Reade (1927, p.11) explained, the preparations 'proved to be a work of considerable magnitude [involving] continuous cooperation ... [between] the Government Town Planner, the District Officer, Public Works and other departments."

The preliminary plan was completed during 1926 (Reade, 1927). It was distinctive for its use of the topography, its implementation of the concept of zoning, and its inclusion of a parkbelt adjacent to the central shop-house zone. The parkbelt utilised lower lying reclaimed mining land and introduced an element that satisfied the garden city requirement of ample public space. The town was separated into commercial, administrative, residential and recreational sectors. The District Offices were located in an administrative hub on a hill overlooking the town centre.

The central commercial core included sites for markets, post office, cinema, police and a fire station. Approximately 320 shop-house lots were set aside for initial development but allowance was made for a further 140. Schools, churches, temples and clubs were allocated in the vicinity of the shop lots. The residential zone not only provided accommodation for government employees and private citizens but also housed the district hospital.

Kuala Kubu Baru (KKB) was prepared in 1926. One of its key features was improvement of Ipoh's main road system (Reade, 1926, 1927; GCTPA, 1929). In 1927 Ipoh hosted the Second Town Planning and Housing Exhibition along the lines of a similar event organised by Reade and his department in Kuala Lumpur a year earlier.

Reade's Annual Reports provide extensive detail of the proposed and executed works in other FMS towns throughout the FMS. The reports describe programmes mostly related to town improvements along the lines of those proposed in the General Town Plan for Kuala Lumpur as well as the planning of new subdivisions and the layout of government quarters. The absence of plans from the reports and of related archival records makes it difficult to identify the extent to which works were carried out. However limited records survive in relation to the development of the hill station of Cameron's (now Cameron) Highlands, approximately 300 kilometres from Kuala Lumpur. Following an official visit to Baguio, the summer capital of the Philippines designed by Daniel Burnham (Taylor, 1993), Reade chaired a committee that prepared a general zoning plan for the Cameron's Highlands (Reade, 1928, 1928b; Proceedings, 1929).

Reade also worked in other parts of British Malaya, advising State Councils for towns in the UMS on town planning matters. With the coming into force of the 1927 Town Planning Enactment, Reade's role was largely supervisory, his Town Planning superintendents dealt with the details, and he was able to give assistance to UMS and elsewhere. For example, in 1927, J.L. Humphreys the Governor of British North Borneo, secured his services to replan the port towns of Jesselton (now Kota Kinabalu) and Sandakan (Reade, 1927; Home 1997).

Observations and comments

Re-planning and redistribution of lots was an idea far in advance of its time in Malaya. It proved impossible to implement given the lack of strong government...
commitment to the concept; the paucity of professionals trained in land re-planning; uncooperative, at times even recalcitrant land administrators; departmental jealousies and the absence of a public interest ideology among land owners (Meng et al., 1990; Shamsudin, 2005).

Decision making at the Federal Council was largely influenced by property and commercial development lobbyists and it lacked sustained political will to support town planning, despite acknowledging the need to remedy previous indecisions and development. Although Reade worked hard between 1921 and 1924 to secure successes in the planning approaches that he advocated, it was not enough to convince the Council of their appropriateness or likely longevity (Shamsudin 2005). Other issues with the Enactment also surfaced including the cost of a separate Town Planning Department, confusion due to the existence of both Sanitary Boards and TPCs; delays in having plans approved (Bristow, 2000) and the communication difficulties that emerged through transferring authority from a locally-based to a federal instrumentality (Garnaut, 1997).

In the upshot of dissatisfaction and unease with the Town Planning Enactment the provision to review it after twelve months was taken up, in 1925, before its first year had passed and before it had even been made fully operational. Reade was on leave at the time undertaking a study trip to Britain, America, China, Japan and the Philippines and intending to return to the FMS with the latest ideas about town planning legislation. A committee of inquiry into the 1923 Enactment recommended major revisions (without consulting the department) which were eventually introduced in 1927.

Under the Town Planning Enactment, 1927, town planning administration became state focussed and was passed to local Sanitary Boards, a responsibility which was formalised under the Sanitary Boards Bill, 1929 (Meng et al., 1990; Bristow, 2000). The purpose and requirements of General Town Plans were simplified. Town Planning Superintendents (positions suggested by Reade upon his return from his overseas leave) were appointed to work in the states and the Government Town Planner’s role was made advisory. To this day, town planning in Malaysia remains a largely de-centralised operation within the local authorities with the Federal Town and Country Planning Department providing advisory, policy and legislative functions via its State Town and Country Planning Department (STCDTP). Areas beyond the local authority jurisdiction, however remain under the purview of the SDTCP (Town and Country Planning Act, amendment 2001). Thus Reade’s wish for the planning of the whole countryside was fulfilled seventy-four years later.

The need for the federal position of Government Town Planner was considered at length during 1929 and deemed unnecessary under the new arrangements (Guillameau to Passfield, 1929). Consequently it was abolished from 7 January 1930. Discussion about the future of the post of Government Town Planner occurred while Reade was on leave in London. The date for the official abolition of the position was set for the day before Reade was due to return to work. He was retired from the FMS on a pension.

High Commissioner Guillameau (Guillameau to Passfield, 1929) explained the decision to abolish the portfolio of Government Town Planner as an outcome of the benefit of hindsight and of policy review (that is, the shift to decentralisation). Privately he was critical of Reade’s wish for the future of the post of Governor Town Planner ‘...having regard to all the circumstances I am disposed to the opinion that the position was neither worthwhile nor desirable’ (Guillameau to Passfield, 1929).

Reade has been blamed for his perceived downfall and town planning’s loss of favour in the 1920s progressed, others were increasingly critical of his work (Meng et al., 1990; Bristow, 2000; Shamsudin, 2005) and the ensuing decentralisation policy as well as to the contribution or lack of it of the Chief Town Planner (that is, Reade) (Bristow, 2000; Garnaut, 2005). Shamsudin (2005) ‘...Charles Compton Reade and the introduction of town planning service in British Malaya (1921–1925), engendering planning focus and necessities within a slump economy’, 8th International Conference of the Asian Planning Schools Association (APSA), available at: http://www.apsa2005.net/PDF/Paper%2005-I-1Kamaluddin%20Shamsudin.pdf


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Railway Housing and Garden Suburb Rhetoric in 1920s New Zealand

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Introduction
Three strands of research into urban history in the early 20th century the English language journals coalesce around topics of private/public housing, garden suburbs and company towns. The private/public housing literature is extensive including work by a range of social scientists as well as historians.1 Town planning as an emerging profession in the early 20th century used Ebenezer Howard's (1850-1928) Tomorrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform first published in 1898 as interpreted by Sir Raymond Unwin (1863-1940) as a springboard for promoting an array of new ideas about urban design and layouts at least of which were intended to eliminate the slums and make for more healthy cities and communities.2 A third literature looks at company town in which some of these preceding concerns reappear.3

This paper explores a New Zealand housing scheme where elements of public housing, garden suburbs, and the company town intersected during the 1920s. This took the form of the New Zealand Railway's efforts to meet its own considerable departmental housing needs in a way that drew on some progressive elements of garden suburbs planning. To date these efforts have been mentioned in passing in standard housing histories although they have not been studied in more detail in terms of architectural history. Of particular focus here are (1) the ways in which garden suburbs ideas diffused to New Zealand and how they were taken up, (2) the significance of the railways scheme alongside other early garden suburb experiments in New Zealand, and (3) to what extent this was guided by a reformist impulse.

Echoes and Resonances: Slums, Public Housing, Town Planning, and Company Towns

There are a numerous period references to a housing problem in early 20th century New Zealand.4 Many of the ideas about solutions in the form of public housing and town planning were taken up in derivative fashion from the UK and applied in New Zealand, one of the most distant corners of the British Empire.

The slum in British urban historiography has been variously presented as a set of material conditions and relationships and as a middle class representation.5 New Zealand, its rural export dependent economy notwithstanding, from the first had a large percentage of the population in urban areas. By 1911, after only 71 years of European colonial settlement when the total population had reached 1.087 million, over 50% were in urban areas of over 1000. As part of the rhetoric of systematic colonisation involved escaping the ill of industrial British, there was some sensitivity to any claims that slums might exist in New Zealand. Yet by the early 20th century these claims were being made of small areas in the major cities. These have been mapped for Auckland and Dunedin.6

One response to a housing crisis that included slum housing and a lack of affordable rental accommodation was a move by central government to provide state built houses for purchase or rent. This was achieved under the Dwellings for Workers Act, 1905.7 It resulted from Premier Richard Seddon's viewing of council housing on a trip to Britain and was spurred on by the lack of progress in municipal areas even though provision existed under their legislation for the construction of rental housing. Less than 700 houses were actually built.8 Yet the Railway's efforts to purchase their own houses they would curb more radical political developments.

Town Planning advocates advanced their own claims for alleviating the slum problem and the housing crisis in New Zealand in the early 1900s. Early town planning advocates such as Charles Reade and William Davidge toured the country in 1914-1915 to warn against the evils of old worn out slums in the colony and offered town planning as the remedy.1 Reade was a New Zealand born journalist who has originally gone to the UK to report on the All Blacks rugby tour in 1905. He stayed to study urban problems in Britain and worked for a time in Unwin's office.1 Reade made much of the slum problem in New Zealand in order to promote garden city ideas.10 Later in his career he was responsible for the designing what became the Colonel Light Gardens, a substantial early garden suburb in South Australia.11 In New Zealand, the garden suburb was one of the earliest ideas to be introduced from British town planning.12
The company town is not such a feature of the New Zealand experience, indeed even the term is contestable. Chapman uses the term ‘single enterprise settlement’ to refer to various hydro and mining towns of the mid 20th century. Earlier examples do exist however notably J. C. Wason who constructed a town at the headwaters of his Cowar Estate in Canterbury in the 1870s. In the New Zealand case the single enterprise towns tended to be state rather than private sector settlements. To the extent that the Town and Country planning Division of the Ministry of Works was involved in designing some of the larger forestry and hydro towns in the 1950s and 1960s there is a link to the British ‘New Towns’ concepts.

New Zealand Railway’s Housing Problems

The completion of a main truck railway line in the North Island of New Zealand in 1908 helped free New Zealand from a dependence on coastal shipping. Managing the flow of freight and passengers as well as expansion of the rail network and routine track maintenance called for large staff. Shift work was part of the routine of keeping a rail service operating. This required a large staff living nearby and available for emergency work. A further complication was the fact that some main line railway junctions were located in isolated rural areas where accommodation was in short supply. Staff transfers were the norm for railways staff and promotion frequently required it. From the 1880s Railways had provided rental houses for station masters and other permanent staff. These houses were largely built on contract for Railways by private builders to an agreed plan prepared by the Public Works Department.

Railways’ renewed efforts in the 1920s took place against a wider backdrop of the ‘housing problem’ in New Zealand. After World War I the influx of 3000 ex-railway return home servicemen returning to employment in the department added to a severe housing shortage. The department realized that accommodation difficulties would make it difficult to retain good staff. In 1922 Railways estimated that an additional 1200 houses were needed for its staff. The problem was considered serious and private builders were heavily committed. State finance became available under the Workers Dwelling Amendment Act, 1910, the Housing Act, 1919, Discharged Soldier Settlement Act, 1917, Advances to Settlers Act and the Advances to Workers Act. But housing shortages remained particularly for rental accommodation as construction efforts made way from low cost rental to more expensive types of dwellings. In these circumstances Railways realised that its previous strategy of relying on the private sector to construct houses to a range of designs was not viable. Instead the department drew on its own not inconsiderable resources to provide for existing and future staff housing needs. This involved making use of the Department’s own forests which normally supplied timber for sleepers and bridge making as well as other construction needs to provide timber for house construction. The department’s newly formed Architecture Branch designed the new railway houses and the rail network transported them in prefabricated form to the construction sites where a two men team could assemble a house in one to two days.

Railways and the Opportunity for Garden Suburbs

The Auckland house factory made produced a small number of standard designs, and from 1920 to 1926 even reduced the cost of these from £871 to £635. The designs were adapted from those in the catalogues of English and US firms producing pre cut houses. The integrated nature of the housing scheme is interesting in its own right, particularly in that it did not attract that much comment at the time. But Railways had seized the opportunity to do more than just mass produce housing by integrated means. From the first the department presented their new housing scheme in terms of garden suburb ideals. It seems reasonable to assume that the Garden Suburbs ideas were grounded in part from the attendance of George Troop the head of Railways Architecture Branch at the Town Planning conference in 1919. Troop was also involved in the Great Wellington Town-planning and Municipal Elections Association, a local version of the British City Beautiful movement.

The conference organiser architect Samuel Hurst Seager had attended the International Housing Conference organised by the International Cities and Town Planning Association in England in 1919 where he recognised Letchworth as the ‘model city’. Hurst Seager was the leading New Zealand proponent of Ebenezer Howard’s garden cities concept and was a principal advocate for town planning in New Zealand in its formative phase. The pinacle of Hurst Seager’s efforts in New Zealand took the form of the New Zealand Town Planning Conference and Exhibition in 1919. This was modelled on a series of similar conferences that Hurst Seager had attended in Australia. It included competitions for designs of garden suburbs and worker’s houses.

Troop was a very experienced Railways officer having designed everything from large wooden and concrete bridges through to large provincial railway buildings such as the notable Dunedin station. Deeply imbued with a Presbyterian values and having been responsible for the logistics of mobilising an Railways battalion for the active service, he gave equal thought to the problems of integrating the returned service men back into the department. In addition Troop had expressed concern for ‘the effects of country service on the family life of the railwaymen’ Sympathetic Ministers of Railways assisted Troop in this regard.

A prime objective of the 1919 conference was to secure town planning legislation for New Zealand. In this respect it was unsuccessful and such legislation was not passed until 1926. Garden city and garden suburbs concepts did however receive significant attention at the conference. However, it was perhaps less Seager’s discussion about the more famous of the British garden suburbs such as Letchworth Garden City that would have provided the inspiration for Troop with Railways department housing problems in mind than the presentation by architect and civic designer Reginald Ford who highlighted the existence what he regarded as some very successful UK small garden suburbs schemes of 20-50 acres [8-20ha]. Whatever the precise source, the ideas was rapidly taken up by the Department at the highest political level: the Minister of Railways subsequently took up the challenge in announcing that ‘I would desire to see every railway settlement a garden suburb’.

Railways and Design of Garden Suburbs

The Railways settlement adjacent to it’s sawmill and house factory at Frankton was the first, largest and most elaborate attempt by to design a settlement on garden suburb lines. Some 30 acres [12ha] of an 80 acre [32 ha] site were taken up by the sawmill timber yards and house factory with the remainder available for a railway settlement to provide housing for workers at its Frankton marshalling yards. This was the scale that Ford had written about. The Architecture Branch design featured a central recreation reserve with smaller reserves at both the eastern and western entrances. The streets took their names from native New Zealand birds. The main street pattern took the form of a grid but with a softening of its harsh edges through the inclusion of crescents at the Eastern and Western ends. Tree lined streets were also envisaged and touted as “an improvement on the usual practice of providing a wide expensive dusty stretch of Macadam”. It was anticipated that the entire settlement was screened by trees, a portion of which still survive. Alleyways link the interior streets to adjacent reserves. Ultimately the Frankton settlement comprised 133 houses by 1926, with space for 160 houses in total. Frankton was intended to provide housing for families; the single men would live in small buns closer to the railway station. The intention was to provide a healthy living environment that would also foster a sense of community. This was to be added to by the construction by Railways staff in their own time of a community hall, including a library, and the establishment of various local sports clubs.

The standard designs produced at the Frankton factory have been subjected to some study from an architectural perspective. The majority of the Frankton houses were of the four AB/296 designs of three bedrooms with a smaller numbers of room AB/326 and AB/1123 houses.

The Other Railway Settlements

Kelloway (Table 1) describes seven out of ten planned railway settlements designed by Troop as model suburbs in 1919.

### Table 1 Railway Garden Suburb Settlements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Area (ac)</th>
<th>Planned</th>
<th>Planned No of Houses</th>
<th>Completed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frankton</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marton</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newmarket</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>1921</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taumarumaru</td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuhape</td>
<td>1921</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohakune</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngati</td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Of these settlements Frankton has the fullest range of the garden suburb design elements. To a lesser extent these are carried over into the much smaller settlement at Marton adjacent to the station notably in the recreation reserves and screening planting.

The gradual decay of the Garden Suburb philosophy in Railways housing can be traced through other settlements. The 54 houses of 33 acres [13 ha] Ohahu Railway settlement in South Auckland dating from 1924, adjacent to a major railways workshop, for instance is wrapped around a central facility the Ohahu bowling club and backs onto a recreation reserve in the form of Struggnes Park but otherwise has little in common with the Frankton or Marton layout.

In Milson Settlement then adjacent to Palmerston North begun in 1926, the more pressing requirements of housing had begun to over ride almost completely the garden suburb aspects of the scheme. Milson
Article

comprised 125 sites on a 58 acre [23 ha] block, although only some 70 houses were constructed on a simple grid layout that lacked any central reserve or plantings to screen the settlement.28

The Ngio settlement was planned to meet a severe accommodation shortage in Wellington and such was the pressure that it was erected by both private contractors and Railways staff.29

The End of the Railways Housing Scheme

After the Garden Suburbs impasse in Railways came to an end before the housing needs of the Department was satisfied. Indeed the need to quickly provide housing was the main reason for its demise. However, this was not the end of the garden suburbs impulse for progressive town planning - it was passed on to a subsequent large scale development project involving Railways in the Hutt Valley Scheme. In 1926 Railways had actually increased it estimate of staff housing requirements up to 1500. The Frankton factory was not capable however and had even provided a small number for the Public Works Department.

When Gordon Coates became Prime Minister in 1925 he retained the Railways portfolio he had earlier held in the W. E. Massey government as a pragmatic centre politician saw the opportunity to further address housing shortages by providing dwelling to local authorities. Coates was aware of private sector concerns about the Railways Department undercapitalising its operation; private contractors but was thinking mainly of providing access to affordable rental housing for those who could not meet the relatively low state lending criteria. At Coates' initiative some 300 Railways houses were made available to the Hutt Valley Volunteer Housing Committee and erected at Morea in Lower Hutt.30

Typical of Coates approach, which may be seen as an extension of pragmatic state involvement in a wide range of spheres was his support of the Hutt Valley Land Settlement Act, 1925. This was a sizable scheme that combined a substantial garden suburb with an industrial estate centred on new railway workshops at Lower Hutt adjacent to Wellington the capital city. A competition was launched for a design for the settlement and this was won Reginald Hammond a New Zealand architect and surveyor who studied town planning at University College London in the early 1920s.31 In 1925 he had won the prize for the design of the Orakei Garden Suburb in Auckland which is seen as one of the progenitors of Labour's State housing scheme of the mid 1930s.32 The scale of the Lower Hutt scheme was an order of magnitude larger than the Railway's own garden suburb settlements.

At the moment of this success, house production at the Frankton ceased abruptly in 1929. Some writers suggest that this represented the victory of private housing providers in lobbying government as the impact of the Great Depression was being felt.33 The General Manager of the Railways Department in his annual report offered another explanation.

The house-factory and sawmill adjacent to Frankton Junction which were established in 1923 for the primary purpose of enabling houses to be constructed for the staff, have, with the completion of the housing programme been closed.34

Subsidiary issues to do with costing and rentals were also raised. The gardening principle on rents had long been that a day's pay would approximate a week's rental. But difficult to reconcile anomalies were occurred when no consideration was made for the age of the dwelling. Not only was the sawmill closed but the equipment was dispersed to other railways workshops across the country. This could be interpreted as a desire at the highest political level that coincided with the Reform Party under Coates losing office in late 1928, to ensure that the department did not again enter into housing production. Further research is called for to clarify this point.

In the longer term this was not the end of Railways housing, a further generation of houses were built for the department by the Public Works Department from the late 1930s to designs similar to those of the State Housing Programme. Some 14 of these houses exist at the Otaheuti settlement with smaller numbers at Milson.

What has been lost sight because of the scale and success of Labour government's schemes of the mid 1930s state housing programme is the extent to which the Railways garden suburbs experiment, in its mass production approach of a limited range of house types, and in the Lower Hutt Scheme that brought together a number of government departments forestalled and trailed on a smaller scale some of the attributes of Labour's housing programme.35

Railway Settlements Today

New Zealand Railways was 'corporatised' as part of a major set of Neo liberal reforms in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The new entity, Railcorp as a commercially oriented State Owned Enterprise, had no interest in owning rental housing. In 1988 they announced their intention to sell off some 2500 railways houses nation wide valued at $NZ287m throughout New Zealand (included around 1000 built after the closure of the Frankton factory). Employees were given the first option with the remaining houses being offered to Housing Corporation. At Frankton around 30% of the houses passed into private ownership with the remainder being acquired by a private company Stoneley Developments. Some 60 houses had been relocated by 1990 by which time that the Hamilton City Council's Heritage Protection Zone was in place.36

Other settlements have been similarly broken up after Railways sold them, At Marton numbers have been relocated while at Tahupe most of the settlement has been sold and shifted. One conspicuously painted purple house is now a retail outlet. The Otahuhu settlement largely retains its physical integrity, including the impressive line of 1908 Public Works Railways houses on the aplly named Railway Row because of its proximity to the Ski fields and the houses have been purchased for seasonal use as private lodges.

The Milson settlement is now a mix of privately owned and occupied houses, (in some case lovingly restored), private rental houses and Housing New Zealand Corporation rental houses. The latter have been restituted in a higher density pattern on part of the original settlement - effectively two where there was a single Railways house and they have been cosmically upgraded with the distinctive porches being replaced by a veranda stretching across the entire front of the dwelling.

The Newmarket settlement in Central Auckland represents the most extreme land use change with all the houses having been removed and several gated high rise apartments occupying the site.

Conclusion

There were a number of limitations to the Railways housing scheme of the 1920s. The designs were not particularly innovative although they were solidly constructed out of good timber.37 There were also financial limits to the scheme - cost wise it was not feasible to ship the prefabricated houses to the South Island, so that railway settlements such as those at Oira, an isolated station in the Southern Alps, were built by private contractors Architecture Branch

Designs.38 The standard setbacks of the houses from the street and situation without respect to prevailing winds or ecological advancement were uniformly applied to all settlements The Railways houses have none of the heritage values that have recently extended either to Seddon's workers dwellings houses on their centenary in 1906 or to the early Labour State houses of the late 1930s.

Hargreaves et al. see the UK concerns for sanitary and health aspects of slum housing, the moral implications of overcrowding and provision of housing all being picked up in New Zealand, though they include the important caveat that 'a major reason for the State's involvement lay in its own intervention in both the financial market in general and the housing financial market in particular during World War I'.39 Merry in Miller notes of the UK that garden suburb ideas 'proved highly popular and readily portable to other cultural political contexts.'40 He also points to 'a climate of internationalism in the social reform and city planning movements of the early twentieth century.'41 Hurst Seager is a prime New Zealand example of someone who moved in this milieu. For New Zealand politicians such as Prime Minister W. F. Massey housing in 1919 was rather more of an issue than town planning, and by repositioning from a variety of means be sought to dissipate social unrest and capture votes from the left. Swenton discusses a similar situation for the UK but one in which the degree of potential civil unrest seems rather higher and the planning and design elements of the housing solution relatively more important.42

Caroline Miller identified the Spar in Christchurch, Darie Hill in Wanganui, and Orakei in Auckland as three commonly identified examples of garden suburbs in the New Zealand setting before pointing to the limited extent to which they actually conform to their British models.43 Elsewhere she suggests that urban conditions in New Zealand produced no more than a token garden suburbs because 'there was simply no demand for the solution'44 and because 'even though the theory may have been well understood by a few ... they could not marshal the required skills and resources to turn the theory into effective practice.'45 Here is a point of difference with respect to the UK situation outlined by Hardy there where were sufficient social capital to advance town planning in the post war era.46

The Railways housing scheme represents another arena in which the garden suburb ideas was put into practice in New Zealand and Frankton should be added to the

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A study of 1920s garden suburb features by the time that Milson was built in 1926. Troup was also a key advocate and Wellington for two terms from 1927 to 1931 he of the slum represents one approach to the study of conference in 1919, Hon Arthur Myers, the Minister of how reformist was the Railways Department garden Finally and most difficult to address is the question of planning including garden to WWI. He eulogised about a 'new order' in which conservatives thought prudent, yet stopped short of greater intervention by governments of both the left Britain of 'a reformist role for the suburban.' Coates also suffered the same limitations. Garden It also suffers the same limitations. Garden
garden city campaign 1914-19 in Western Canada. 1877-1974, 187-206, Sklifter, K. 1991, Housing reform, garden suburbs and suburban planning at Bristol, Planning History, 13, 12-23, Miller, M. 1973 The suburbanisation of railways housing was Gordon Coates. From a rural background Coates from a rural background. Coates had entered parliament as a Liberal MP). But the most significant were the garden suburbs. Where did they come from? In the early 1920s, a number of town planning schemes were initiated in the UK, including the Garden City movement. This movement was led by Ebenezer Howard, who published his influential essay on 'The City in Miniature' in 1898. The garden city was envisioned as a self-sufficient community where people could live in harmony with nature. The first garden city, Letchworth, was established in 1903, followed byaconsbury in 1919. These early garden cities were characterised by a mix of residential, industrial, and agricultural areas, with a strong emphasis on green spaces and public amenities. However, the garden city movement faced significant challenges. The early garden cities were often criticized for their lack of economic viability, with many failing to attract sufficient numbers of residents to sustain their economies. Additionally, the garden city movement was not without its critics, who argued that it was elitist and did not address the housing needs of the working class. Despite these challenges, the garden city movement had a lasting impact on urban planning and architecture. It inspired many other garden city schemes and influenced the development of other housing, urban design, and planning concepts.

35 Trup, ibid.


39 AJHR D2 1919 xxxii.


42 Ferguson, ibid.

43 Otira Village Map

Otira Village Project 1999

44 Hargreaves, R. Hearn, T., and Little, S. ibid, p. 47.

45 Miller, M. 2002, ibid, p. 6.

46 Miller, M. 2002 ibid, p. 11.


48 Miller, C. 2004, ibid.

49 Miller, C. 2002, ibid, p. 452.

50 Miller, C. 2004, ibid p. 52.

51 Hardy, F. 1989, War, planning and social change the example of the garden city campaign 1914-1940, Planning Perspectives, 4, 187-206.

52 Miller, C. and Roche, M. 2003, New Zealand's 'New Order': Town Planning and Soldier Settlement after the First World War, War and Society, 21, 62-81

53 Myers in Miller, C. and Roche, M. ibid, p. 74.

54 Hardy, ibid, p.192.

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